# Office for <br> Budgeł Responsibility 

Fiscal sustainability report 2018
and accounting for student loans
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## Material published today

- OBR
- Fiscal sustainability report 2018
- Student loans and fiscal illusions
- HM Treasury
- Managing fiscal risks
- ONS
- Looking ahead: developments in public sector finances statistics


## Focus of my remarks

- Long-term public finance projections
- Chapters 3 and 4 of the FSR
- Accounting for student loans
- Working paper


## Long-term projections

- Cover spending, revenue, balance and debt
- 50-year horizon
- Based on current policy, as best defined
- Projections, not precise forecasts
- Sensitivities important


## The ageing population



## Old-age dependency ratio



## Population by age



## Population by age



## Revenues and spending by age



## Other cost pressures in health

- Spending assumed to accommodate nondemographic pressures on health
- Technological advances
- Relatively weak productivity growth
- Spread of chronic conditions


## Real growth in health spending



## Health spending as \% of GDP



## Health spending as \% of GDP



## Non-interest spending

| Per cent of GDP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 7 - 1 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 2 - 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 6 7 - 6 8}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Health | 7.1 | 7.6 | 13.8 |
| Adult social care | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.9 |
| Education | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.8 |
| State pensions | 5.1 | 5.0 | 6.9 |
| Pensioner benefits | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Public service pensions | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.5 |
| Total age-related spending | 20.5 | 20.9 | 29.2 |
| Other welfare benefits | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.2 |
| Other spending | 11.4 | 11.0 | 11.2 |
| Spending | 36.7 | 36.4 | 44.6 |

## Non-interest spending

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## The primary budget balance



## Student loans and net debt



## Net debt: baseline projection



## Net debt: sensitivities



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## Targeting 40\% debt-to-GDP ratio



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## Net debt: baseline projection



## Changes since FSR 2017

| Per cent of GDP in 2067-68 | Primary <br> balance | Net debt |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| FSR 2017 | 7.4 | 241.2 |
| FSR 2018 | 8.6 | 282.8 |
| Change | $\mathbf{+ 1 . 3}$ | $\mathbf{+ 4 1 . 6}$ |
| of which: |  |  |
| Classification | 0.0 | -3.7 |
| Medium-term and modelling | 0.0 | +9.5 |
| Demography | +0.2 | +8.9 |
| Dilnot/SPA | -0.4 | -31.0 |
| June health announcement | +1.5 | +57.9 |

## Policy changes since FSR 2017



## Policy changes since FSR 2017



## The June health announcement

- Increases spending by roughly £20bn in 2022-23 compared to what we would otherwise expect
- PM says it will be paid from a "Brexit dividend, with us as a country contributing a little more" - no more detail
- Brexit likely to weaken public finances overall
- Potential £13.3bn saving in direct budget contributions in 2022-23, but $£ 7.5$ bn is needed for withdrawal settlement and the Government has made other commitments
- So we assume announcement adds to total spending and borrowing


## Health spending and pressures



## Health spending and pressures



## Health spending and pressures



## Long-term projections: summary

- Pressure from ageing and other health costs
- Common to most industrial countries
- Outlook worse than last year, thanks to demography and health announcement
- Outlook depends on live policy choices over social care, pensions uprating and health
- Further policy action likely to be necessary


## Student loans and fiscal illusions

- Student loans are important to public finances
- Outlays rising to $£ 19$ bn by 2022-23
- Loan book rising to $20 \%$ of GDP by 2040s
- But hard to capture meaningfully in fiscal aggregates as full impact takes more than three decades


## Cash flows for 2017-18 cohort



## Student loans and fiscal illusions

- Public finance statistics comply with ESA10
- Student loans treated like other loans
- But repayments set at $9 \%$ on earnings above $£ 25 \mathrm{k}$ and debt outstanding written off after 30 years
- Significant subsidy despite relatively high interest rate
- Government periodically sells loan book tranches


## Current accounting treatment

|  | Loan <br> extension | Capitalised <br> interest | Cash <br> repayments | Write offs |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Public sector net debt | Increases | No impact | Decreases | No impact |
| Public sector net <br> borrowing | No impact | Decreases | No impact | Increases |
| Public sector net <br> financial liabilities | No impact | Decreases | No impact | Increases |

## PSND and PSNFL: 2017-18 cohort



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## PSND and PSNFL: full loan book



## PSND and PSNFL: full loan book



## Cash flows for 2017-18 cohort



## PSNB: 2017-18 cohort



## PSNB: full loan book



2013-14 2022-23 2031-32 2040-41 2049-50 2058-59

## PSNB: full loan book



2013-14 2022-23 2031-32 2040-41 2049-50 2058-59

## Selling tranches of the loan book

- Selling loans lowers net debt, increases net financial liabilities and leaves net borrowing unaffected
- But selling loans means write-offs never hit the deficit, creating incentive to fund them this way
- Government says it is right to sell assets that have "achieved their original policy objective"
- But £12bn loan sales to 2020-21 will forego £23bn of future repayments
- Public benefit of sales not immediately obvious


## Desirable features of treatment

- Record expected losses up-front
- Only record income the government is likely to receive
- Maintain the convention that accruals treatment eventually equals cash treatment
- Remove perverse incentives to sell loan book


## Options we examine

- Treat loans as grant spending plus taxes
- Avoid recording interest that will never be repaid
- Treat repaid loans as loans and others as grants
- Focus on cost to government, not loan terms
- Commercial accounting approach using NPVs


## Options we examine: PSNB



## Removing the fiscal illusion



