

Office for
**Budget
Responsibility**

Economic and fiscal outlook

March 2012

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Chairman**

EFO coverage and process

- **Five year forecasts for the economy and public finances, plus assessment of progress against fiscal targets**
- **Forecasts closed on March 7 bar impact of measures**
- **Independent *Budget Responsibility Committee* responsible for assumptions, judgements and conclusions**
- **BRC helped by OBR staff and drawing on expertise in many Whitehall departments and other bodies**
- **No political or official pressure to change anything**


Overview

- **Economic outlook**
 - Little change since November
 - Budget measures broadly neutral over the forecast
- **Fiscal outlook**
 - Little underlying change since November
 - But Royal Mail pension transfer has big impact next year
- **Cutting the 50p income tax rate**
 - Looks inexpensive, but revenue forecast also revised down


GDP growth

% growth p.a.	November EFO	March EFO	Change
2011	0.9	0.8	-0.1
2012	0.7	0.8	+0.1
2013	2.1	2.0	-0.1
2014	2.7	2.7	0
2015	3.0	3.0	0
2016	3.0	3.0	0

Level of GDP since the trough



GDP growth per quarter



Household consumption

% growth p.a.	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
New forecast	-0.8	0.5	1.3	2.3	3.0	3.0
<i>Change from Nov</i>	+0.2	+0.4	+0.1	+0.1	+0.3	+0.1
Memo: GDP	0.8	0.8	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.0

- **Consumption growth revised up slightly since November, thanks in part to PPI payouts and stronger asset prices**
- **But continues to drag on the recovery until growth in real wages resumes in earnest in 2014**

Business investment

% growth p.a.	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
New forecast	0.2	0.7	6.4	8.9	10.2	10.1
<i>Change from Nov</i>	+0.9	-6.9	-2.5	-0.5	-2.4	-2.3
Memo: GDP	0.8	0.8	2.0	2.7	3.0	3.0

- **Key driver of recovery – rises as a share of GDP**
- **Boosted slightly by Budget corporation tax cut**
- **But revised down since November thanks to weak 2011Q4 data and assessment of corporate cash position**
- **Forecast recovery weaker than in the 1990s**

Business investment: now & 90s



Other components of demand

- **Housing investment**
 - To revive as housing market returns to normal
- **Government spending and investment**
 - Slightly bigger contribution to growth than in November
 - Because cuts showing up more in prices than output
- **Net trade**
 - Positive but diminishing contribution
 - Slightly weaker than November thanks to export markets

Labour market

- **Little change to ILO (un)employment since November. Unemployment to rise from 8.4% to peak at 8.7% later this year**
- **But claimant count unemployment revised down**
- **Government employment projected to fall by 730,000 from Q1 2011 to 2017**
- **20,000 more than in November**
- **Outweighed by 1.7m rise in market sector employment**


Inflation

- **Inflation revised down slightly since November**
- **CPI inflation slightly below target in 2013 and 2014**
- **VAT and excise duties measures: very small upward effect**
- **Risk from oil prices**

Potential output I

- **Business surveys and earnings growth suggest little change in spare capacity in Q4 despite weak GDP growth**
- **Economy assumed to be running 2.5% below full potential in Q4 and 2.7% below potential for 2011 as a whole**


Output gap in 2011



Potential output II

- **Growth in potential GDP assumed to recover to long-run average over next two years – as in November**
- **Potential GDP in line with OECD and IMF estimates over the course of the forecast and somewhat higher than European Commission**

Potential output forecasts



The public finances in 2011-12

- **Public sector net borrowing (PSNB) forecast at £126bn this year – down £1.1bn since November**
- **Government departments expected to underspend by £6bn against plans and by £5.5bn against November forecast**
- **But tax revenues also expected to come in £5bn below November forecast – mostly recent weakness in self-assessment receipts**

Public sector net borrowing

	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17
Cash (£bn)	126	92	98	75	52	21
<i>Change from Nov</i>	<i>-1.1</i>	<i>-28</i>	<i>-2</i>	<i>-4</i>	<i>-1</i>	<i>-2</i>
Memo: % GDP	8.3	5.8	5.9	4.3	2.8	1.1

- **Very small deficit-reducing revisions since November**
- **Only big change is in 2012-13: Royal Mail pension transfer**

Royal Mail pension transfer

- **Government taking Royal Mail's historic pension deficit – plus associated pension fund assets – onto public sector balance sheet on April 1**
- **Impact:**
 - £28bn one-off cut in PSNB in 2012-13
 - £23bn cut in net debt from 2013-14 as assets sold
 - £1.3-1.6bn increase in annual pension spending
- **Looks favourable short-term, but not long-term**
 - Present value of assets = £28bn
 - Present value of liabilities = £37.5bn

Receipts and spending


- **Little net change in either receipts or spending at the end of our forecast horizon**
- **Receipts revised up £0.1bn in 2016-17**
 - Downward revisions from self assessment shortfall, lower oil production and weaker property market
 - Upward revisions from higher profits, lower investment, higher VAT and higher share prices
- **Spending revised down by £2.4 in 2016-17**
 - Lower interest rates
 - Afghanistan special reserve reduction
 - Cap on potential costs of Universal Credit

The fiscal mandate

- **Balance or surplus in the cyclically adjusted current budget balance 5 years ahead – currently 2016-17**


CACB in 2016-17	Cash	% GDP
November forecast	9.4	0.5
Change in output gap		-0.2
Other forecast changes		+0.2
Budget measures		+0.0
March forecast	8.7	0.5

Uncertainty and the mandate



- **Implies 60% chance of success**

The supplementary target



- **Change in PSND in 2015-16 stays at -0.3% GDP**

The additional rate: our task

- **OBR has to judge if HMG costing of cut to 45p “reasonable and central” (not if it is a good idea)**
- **Costing informed by HMRC analysis of 50p yield**
- **OBR forecasts inherited last Government’s costing of 50p rate from March 2010 Budget forecast**
- **So also need to check that any reassessment of what the 50p rate would have raised is properly reflected in our baseline pre-measures forecast**


The original 50p costing

- **March 2010 Budget estimated that 50p rate would raise £2.7bn in 2012-13**
- **300,000 people would pay £7.5bn more if they did not change their behaviour**
- **But £4.9bn would never materialise because of:**
 - **People working less, retiring early or leaving the country**
 - **More tax planning, avoidance and evasion**
- **2008 study for IFS suggested bigger behavioural response and less revenue**


New HMRC analysis

- **Based on 2010-11 self-assessment returns**
- **Suggests people shifted at least £16bn of income into 2009-10 from future years to avoid 50p**
 - e.g directors bringing forward dividend payments
- **Also suggests bigger underlying behavioural response than the original costings – at or above level suggested by IFS study**
- **Costing and forecast now assume behavioural response broadly in line with IFS study**

Moving from 50p: costs and gains




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
Implications: baseline forecast

- **Need to ensure baseline forecast reflects scale of forestalling and stronger behavioural response**
- **New study suggests 50p rate would have raised £1.5-2bn less than original costing**
- **Need to take the difference out of the forecast, but some of it will have shown up already in weak 2010-11 PAYE receipts and previous forecasts**


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


Moving from 50p: costs and gains




— New behaviour — Old behaviour

Moving from 50p: costs and gains



— New behaviour — Old behaviour

Moving from 50p: costs and gains



Implications: costings

	50p to 45p	50p to 40p
New behaviour	-£50-100m	-£700m
Old behaviour	-£800m	-£2.1bn

- **New behavioural response looks reasonable and central**
- **HMRC study might point to even bigger response, but data limited and potential asymmetry**
- **Huge uncertainty around all such estimates and evidence likely to evolve further**
- **Behaviour not fixed – affected by policy choices**